Have I got a treat for you! Gary Oldham, an expert in many things response-related, including ICS, who has been doing work in this field for almost as long as I’ve been alive has contributed a comment to our ongoing discussion on the role of public information in the ICS structure. See below for the full post:

Let me start out with some full disclosure. I was pretty heavily involved in the fairly early days of ICS’s evolution as part of Project FIRESCOPE in California. I’ve served in a lot of ICS roles, including that of PIO (and initially when I filled that role – long, long ago – it was called FIO, for Fire Information Officer. And back then, Operations was called “Suppression and Rescue.” This was back before we recognized the “all-hazards” value of ICS.) Because of that, perhaps, I tend to be protective, perhaps over-protective of ICS.
The ideas presented here merit a lot of thought and sole searching. I tend to initially reject out of hand ideas that involve major overhauling of ICS. The beauty of ICS is its scalability and indeed its all-hazards nature and applicability. But we need to be open to the idea that we may need to do some revamping at some point.

I’m not sure this is it, though. I continue to believe the fundamentals, the underpinnings, of ICS are as solid today as they were in 1980. We’re better at using it than we were then. But we need to do some things differently, and information dissemination is certainly one of those. I’m a big proponent of social media in emergency management and public safety, and SM can certainly be a tool in the Information Officer’s toolkit within ICS. If there are things that impede information flow and release, they need to be fixed. Systemically if that’s where the problem resides, or on an individual incident or incident commander basis where appropriately. If IC approval is unduly slowing information release, then that incident needs some standing orders about how/when/and by whom information is going to be released so that routine releases don’t need specific IC approval. If there’s a trust issue there between the IC and PIO, that needs rectifying – through some candid dialog, through some accelerated approval processes that let each person get a feel for the others abilities and sensibilities, and a mutual effort. Items that are more sensitive – names of injured or killed, for but one example – may need specific approval, and working protocols can easily allow for that. None of these things require that ICS change; its framework certainly allows for protocols like these to be quickly implemented.

I watched the Deepwater Horizon debacle often in agony at how ICS had been bastardized and then criticized for its inadequacies. ICS was fine. NIMS added some useful things – like the Multi-Agency Coordination Center function, which is tremendous when done properly (as it was back in the 80s and 90s in California, where hard resource allocation decisions were made quickly, judiciously, and fairly by involved stakeholders). The Joint Information is another NIMS aspect that can be a good thing – or not, when done improperly. But the real bastardization of ICS came from the “oil spill version” that gives the violator, the causal agent, the “responsible party” (in law enforcement, we usually called them “the suspect”) a seat at the command table. In my mind, that’s where the Deepwater Horizon management effort reached the “success is impossible” threshhold. You can’t have parties with diametrically opposed agendas and goals sitting at the table with equal authority and reach a result that satisfies both parties. We really don’t need, in my mind, “versions” of ICS for oil spills, hospitals, schools, etc. ICS lets an incident or an organization fill roles as needed for their particular situation; it doesn’t require a separate “version.” And in no case, should “responsible parties” OR “suspects” get an equal say in how an incident is managed, OR how/what information is disseminated.

I think the closing sentence in this essay really hits the crux of the issues: “I see certain enlightened ICs perceiving as using it as tool (i.e. radio, shovel, dosimeter, etc.) , versus an independent function.” I completely agree – and I believe “enlightened” is the operative word. An enlightened IC working with a savvy PIO doesn’t need ICS’ framework to be altered, he or she just needs to recognize that ICS is a tool, too, and it is a flexible tool that allows these goals to be achieved within its existing framework. I don’t think ICS needs modernization – I think many of US do.

Thanks for this thought-provoking essay, and for the opportunity to weigh in on it.

Truly thought-provoking. Thanks so much for your contribution, Gary.

Wow! What a response! In four years of blogging, I’ve never had that much feedback. And the people who commented and messages and tweeted and emailed are pretty much my heroes in this field, so yeah, banner day.

The other part of that great response, and arguably the more important part, is that so many people thought it was an important enough topic to actually speak up about it. And yes, the vast majority didn’t agree with my proposal, but it was poorly fleshed out solution. The idea, though, had some traction. People are worried that the current ICS structure might not be the best way to handle today’s media landscape. We might be onto something here.

So, what exactly are we on to? Following is some of the comments I received about my ICS post:

First, Patrice Cloutier disagreed with my idea:

I’d keep it a command position to ensure that the PIO has the opportunity to get the whole picture and interact with higher level echelons that interact with the IC.

Much better, because it’s a more and more operational AND liaison function, to keep it with command instead of moving it under ops.

His feeling was that the problem is less about the placement of public information on an org chart, and more about taking public information preparedness more seriously, at all levels:

To deal with the challenges brought by social media in terms of immediacy of a communications response you need a sound crisis comms plan with pre-approved messaging and the right channels to communicate quickly and effectively with all your audiences. No need to do that from the ops section…

Marcus Deyerin agrees with Patrice in disagreeing with me, saying:

One of if not the principle function of the JIC is to provide coordinated and unified messaging to the public that supports the overall strategy – and that insight has to come from the IC. For example, the IC wouldn’t want the Public Works department to independently send out a Tweet that a road is clear and open, because the IC may want it to remain closed to the public so it’s available exclusively to emergency responders.

He advocates taking the idea of pre-approved messages a bit further:

An example might be an [social media] post from the field that “responders still clearing slide on Hwy X, area remains hazardous.” This on-the-spot responder initiated report feeds the information beast, while supporting the general message of “stay away, let us do our job.”

He also notes, correctly, the measured growth of ICS, specifically pointing to the inclusion of the Intelligence component:

Just as we’ve seen how the “intel” function has morphed into a “put it where it makes sense” element, so too may SM emerge. But given the go-slow approach with how the Feds tweak ICS (which isn’t necessarily a bad thing), I wouldn’t expect social media to show up under the Ops section as it very own box anytime soon. If anything, I see certain enlightened ICs perceiving as using it as tool (i.e. radio, shovel, dosimeter, etc.) , versus an independent function.

Gerald Baron, in his response post, echoes a lot of what the two gentlemen above said. I definitely think you should read his whole post here. I’m pretty amazed how the core of those three posts is really the same.

So, to bring it back to the original post, where does this leave us? I’m pretty sure that you all have convinced me that public information doesn’t belong in Operations. (You could even argue that social media monitoring performs some of the requirements of the Planning section.)

What’s next, then? Well, first there needs to be a serious discussion about the role of public information, especially with regards to social media, in ICS. Assuming there should be a PIO role (and I’m all for that) that reports directly to the IC, how can one centralize public information, while allowing for the speed (and benefits, see Planning note above) that today’s media needs (and can offer)? I’m not so naive to think that just because a problem has been identified that a solution is possible. Addressing our concerns might be as simple as PIOs and ICs learning to manage information better. But we at least have to have the discussion first.

H/T to @kim26stephens for the post title.