Author: Jim

Earlier this year, the scholarly journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Research published an extremely interesting article entitled Exploring communication, trust in government, and vaccination intention later in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: results of a national survey. If you know someone who has access to that journal, I highly recommend you read the article. And if you don’t know someone, I’ve pulled out three of the biggest points from the article, and plan to talk about it all week in a series I’m calling Trust in H1N1. You can find links to the other two posts on this article following today’s post.

Today we’re talking about uncertainty.

Uncertainty is a strange thing. In emergencies, like a pandemic, the only thing that you can be completely sure of, is that things will change. The situation, the recommendations, the guidance, the response, the players. Some, or all, of it will change. Change breeds uncertainty. Uncertainty about a situation leads to doubt, unfocused response, questions and recriminations. Uncertainty is a capital “B” Bad Thing.

But if it’s a constant in emergencies, why is it so bad? Well, it’s bad for the response for obvious reasons. When you don’t know what’s going to happen next, it’s tough to plan, but there is another reason, and it has to do with trust.

Many response communicators worry that if you keep changing the message, you’ll ruin your credibility. And that’s not completely untrue. A communicator that constantly changes their message will appear scattershot, unfocused and unbelievable. But in an emergency, by the very nature of the emergency, things will change and what we’re saying will have to change. So what do we do?

The article we’ve been reviewing deals with this idea of uncertainty and trust, quoting no less than former CDC Director Dr. Richard Besser during the H1N1 response:

I want to acknowledge the importance of uncertainty. At the early stages of an outbreak, there’s much uncertainty, and probably more than everyone would like. … We’re moving quickly to learn as much as possible and working with many local, state and international partners to do so. … I want to acknowledge change. Our recommendations, advice, approaches will likely change as we learn more about the virus and we learn more about its transmission.

The research showed that the openness shown by government officials was greatly appreciated by the public.

By addressing uncertainty early in the crisis, it appears the government was able to influence the public’s acceptance of future changes in understanding and behavioral recommendations. In our results, we saw over 90% agreement with the item, “I understand that information about swine flu will change as scientists learn more about the virus.”

The problem isn’t that we have to change our messages. The problem is that we aren’t being honest with our publics. We still think we can get in front of them, tell them what’s what and that we’re in charge. We’re not being open and honest and letting them know that, hey, we’re not positive, we’re not perfect, but dammit, we’re working hard and we’ll keep you in the loop because you’re important and vital and we want you on our team.

That’s what Dr. Besser was talking about. Openness, honesty, transparency. These aren’t just hallmarks of a twenty-first century communications system, they are vital parts to mounting an effective emergency communications campaign. They are vital to success. As we’ve said before, a poorly executed information campaign can sink any response. Not being trusted, not being believed is item 1A in the definition of a failed response. Not dealing with uncertainty early is one of the best ways to destroy that trust.

Trust in H1N1: The Messenger
Trust in H1N1: Building Trust

Earlier this year, the scholarly journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Research published an extremely interesting article entitled Exploring communication, trust in government, and vaccination intention later in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: results of a national survey. If you know someone who has access to that journal, I highly recommend you read the article. And if you don’t know someone, I’ve pulled out three of the biggest points from the article, and plan to talk about it all week in a series I’m calling Trust in H1N1. You can find links to the other two posts on this article following today’s post.

Today we’re talking about building trust.

Trust is a central component to almost everything we do. It is what allows government to operate. Trust is our currency and our charter. Without trust, why would anyone listen to us? Why would the public not revolt and overthrow us? Trust is the only thing keeping our society together. And yet, we haven’t been great stewards of the public’s trust. One needs only to look at the Edelman Trust Barometer to see how poorly government the world over is trusted. But that doesn’t mean that all hope is lost. Our article today talks about trust: who is trusted and how to build trust.

First, who is trusted? Research from H1N1 showed that, in a pandemic, public health officials were the most trusted:

… CDC officials as the most trusted, followed by state and local public health officials and Secretary Sebelius. Interestingly, while elected officials were typically less trusted than public health authorities, President Obama was the next most trusted after the HHS Secretary.
…
Local and state elected offiicals did not fare as well as trusted spokespersons either eiarly or in the midst of the pandemic.

This passage raises an interesting point. First, research is showing that subject matter experts are who our messengers should be. Elected officials maybe shouldn’t be. So how do you tell the elected officials that they should probably avoid the limelight?

But where does that trust come from? Why experts and not electeds? The article hints that the reason might be the actions taken. Subject matter experts and public health officials are the ones leading a pandemic response, so they’ve got some background in the topic. Elected officials may come off as opportunistic. But what comes first, the action of protecting the public’s health engendering trust, or being trusted to implement the public health response?

Selective exposure theory posits that people’s choice of information exposure in a pandemic will confirm their preexisting beliefs and predispositions and that whether someone chooses official sources in a pandemic may be determined well in advance of the event.

But the last sentence in that passage is what I want to really point out:

This speaks to the importance of building trust in and loyalty to official sources as well as educating people about what to do in a pandemic (e.g., hygiene, vaccination, social distancing, etc.) in advance of a pandemic.

So how do you do that?! (If only there was a blog about emergency risk communication, government communication and crisis communication to help you walk through that kind of thinking…) Well, the answer is to look at the current state of things (see the Edelman Trust Barometer link again) and ask if that really is good enough. If not, then something needs to change. Think about what makes you trust something: openness, availability, history, track record of success. Do you do those things? Is that what you’re known for? If not, maybe that’s where you should start.

Trust in H1N1: The Messenger
Trust in H1N1: Uncertainty

Earlier this year, the scholarly journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Research published an extremely interesting article entitled Exploring communication, trust in government, and vaccination intention later in the 2009 H1N1 pandemic: results of a national survey. If you know someone who has access to that journal, I highly recommend you read the article. And if you don’t know someone, I’ve pulled out three of the biggest points from the article, and plan to talk about it all week in a series I’m calling Trust in H1N1. You can find links to the other two posts on this article following today’s post.

Today we’re talking about the messenger.

Very often, when we talk about government emergency communication, we talk about the message. We plan for what we’ll say. We have message maps and approved talking points, templated press releases and FAQs, dark sites and empathetic Facebook messages. We don’t lack for what to say in many planning areas. (I’m willing to bet that no other disaster has had as many potential messages written about it as has an aerosolized anthrax attack, and this is due solely to the CDCs Cities Readiness Initiative funding and program.) We write messages all day, and some of us even pilot test them, get them approve and practice turning the templates into real messages. Boy, we are ready to go.

Unfortunately, that’s only part of the equation. As anyone who has ever taken a media relations course or some sort of in-front-of-camera training will tell you, up to eight percent of the audience’s comprehension comes from non-verbal cues. But where in our planning documents does it tell folks not to read in a monotone voice, or not to shuffle their feet, or strive to make eye contact with the cameras (or media folks), not to fidget and to turn off your cell phone? It doesn’t, and that’s a huge problem because if you put the wrong person up there, it could do as much to derail your messaging as not having pilot tested your messages. While the research is extremely nascent in this particular topic, there is some interesting anecdotes and correlations that support that who says something is almost as important as what they say (hm, sounds almost like the tagline for this blog that I know…).

There is growing consensus that, as Larson and Heymann remind us, “It is not only the ‘what’ that matters [with regard to what is communicated], but ‘who’ is conveying the information or concerns and ‘how’ it is communicated.

While trust scales are being developed to give us a way to model trustworthy speech, real life messengers are demonstrating how things should be done. Folks like Governor Frank Keating and Mayor Rudy Giuliani have shown, in the worst possible situations, how the right person saying the right thing at the right time can make all of the difference:

It may behoove them to adopt the “Giuliani model,” based on then-Mayor Giuliani’s behavior after the 2001 anthrax attacks: He conveyed empathy, compassion, and grasp of the complex situation and made excellent use of his team of experts, each speaking to his or her specific area of responsibility.

But sometimes, even saying the right thing isn’t enough. It’s demonstrating that the messenger really truly believes in what they’re saying, and are willing to prove it. Read about President Barack Obama’s decision to publicly vaccinate his daughters against H1N1:

[I]t appears the president’s [sic] actions to vaccinate his children may have transcended typical political divisions and allowed the public to see him as a parent making decisions on behalf of his family. This suggests that having highly visible role models may be an effective communication strategy, particularly as it may reflect the emphasis on fiduciary responsibility and fairness as a critical component of trust in the context of vaccination decisions.

…

Our findings are consistent with a report from the United Kingdom that asserted that then-Prime Minister Tony Blair’s unwillingness to disclose the vaccination status of his young son during the controversy over the MMR vaccine undermined the government’s own message about the safety of the vaccine.

So, by all means, continue to plan your messages out. But don’t, for one second, believe that your work is done. Choosing the right spokesperson to deliver those messages might be just as important. And something that can easily be practiced today. A less well-known facet of Mayor Giuliani’s performance in the days following the 9/11 attacks was that much of what he said was planned, practiced, tweaked and updated. His executive team regularly practiced not only disaster drills, but what to say to the media and the public following the disaster. He helped the public start to move on from the attack, but it was less about him as a person and more about his exceptional team and comprehensive pre-planning that was more than a dusty old binder.

Trust in H1N1: Building Trust
Trust in H1N1: Uncertainty